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Terrorism and maritime shipment of nuclear
material
R. C. Smith*
Opponents of the nuclear industry often claim that material in transit is vulnerable to attack by
terrorist groups who might seek to take the cargo and make a bomb, or otherwise cause a
radiological incident. This paper lays out a range of conceivable objectives or attack scenarios in
the context of maritime transportation and examines these in the light of what is known of the
relevant security arrangements. It concludes that these arrangements provide a very substantial
deterrent to any attempt at diversion or sabotage and that any such attempt would have little
prospect of success, beyond the immediate media impact of whatever might have occurred.
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Introduction
It seems that almost every maritime shipment of nuclear
materials is accompanied by dramatic claims that the
cargo (or ship) is vulnerable to sabotage or diversion by
terrorists (with disastrous consequences), although what
these terrorists might do, or attempt to do, is seldom
made clear. As a consequence, the public is left with
vague and ill defined fears and little understanding of
what the real risk might be. The present article aims to
review the whole range of possibilities: different
materials and different quantities; and, particularly,
the specific details of the transport arrangements, with a
view to identifying what might be attempted, in what
circumstances, and with what prospects of success.
Critics also often include concerns about the possibility
of a purely accidental release of nuclear material. This
was the subject of an earlier paper by this author.1 It has
also been the subject of a number of extensive expert
reports. It will not be pursued further here.
Possible targets for terrorism range from relatively
small consignments of radioactive materials (such as
radioactive sources), which are dispatched with other
materials on a journey which includes a maritime com-
ponent, to nuclear consignments in shipping containers,
which are transported along with other containers
(cargoes such as yellow cake, or uranium hexafluoride,
or spent fuel from a research reactor), to substantial
quantities of nuclear material carried on dedicated ships.
The dominant company here is Pacific Nuclear
Transport Ltd (PNTL), which operates a fleet of ocean
going nuclear carriers that have been used mainly to
take material between Europe and Japan. PNTL ships
were also used in the 2004/2005 transfer of plutonium
from the United States to France and Mixed Oxide fuel
(MOX) back from France to the United States. This
latter category (large quantities of nuclear material
carried on ships specially designed for the purpose) has
been the most productive of public concern (however ill
founded) and this will be the main focus of the
discussion to come.
Even here, though, the range of possibilities is wide
and the nature of the supposed danger is different in
different cases. Cargoes in this case may be separated
military plutonium (the raw material for weapon pits, or
material from dismantled weapons); separated civilian
plutonium (from civilian reprocessing activities); spent
fuel (containing civilian plutonium); MOX fuel (contain-
ing civilian or military plutonium, diluted with depleted
uranium and made up into MOX fuel rods); or fission
products held in solid suspension. In the case of
substantial long distance cargoes of plutonium contain-
ing material (other than spent fuel) the relevant
regulatory requirements that are applicable to a state
that is signatory to The Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material include the provision of
an escort vessel.2 For PNTL, this requirement is met by
the utilisation of a second, identical, cargo vessel.
Consignments of highly enriched uranium (HEU) are
also of interest in view of their greater potential
suitability (compared to plutonium) for the production
of an improvised nuclear device (IND). It is assumed
that this highly enriched uranium is most likely to be
contained in made-up fuel rods for research reactors
(rather than dispatched as the pure oxide, or even the
metal) and carried in shipping containers on commercial
vessels, or, perhaps, consigned by air.
The range of theoretical possibilities for what
terrorists might aim to do is equally wide. Most
obviously, they might attempt to seize a cargo of
weapons grade plutonium, or uranium, and make a
nuclear weapon, or weapons. The extent to which
civilian (‘reactor grade’) plutonium is suitable for
weapon fabrication is a matter for debate but insofar
as it is possible to create some sort of nuclear explosive
device from this material (with whatever limitations) this
is also a risk. As noted above, civilian spent fuel rods
Department of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Waikato,
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand
*Corresponding author, email rjsmit@waikato.ac.nz
 W. S. Maney & Son Ltd 2007
DOI 10.1179/174651007X265051 Packaging, Transport, Storage & Security of Radioactive Materials 2007 VOL 18 NO 4 207
and fresh MOX rods also contain plutonium of one kind
or another. They could thus be a starting point for
weapon fabrication. However, they would require a
significant amount of processing to separate the small
percentage of plutonium (assuming appropriate technol-
ogy to be available), and, even then, in the case of
civilian sourced plutonium the terrorists might have a
material of dubious value to them. The mixture of
fission products contained in shipments of separated
high level waste is of no use for the production of
nuclear explosive devices, though it could be used for the
assembly of radiological weapons (as could any radio-
active source, including the plutonium sources men-
tioned above). Spent fuel also contains plutonium but in
this case it is mixed (amongst other things) with the very
radioactive products of uranium fission. This is a very
substantial barrier to diversion of nuclear weapons
purposes.
There is another range of theoretical possibilities for
terrorist action in regard to maritime shipments of
radioactive material, which do not entail actual removal
of the material from the ship. These are important since
the conditions of transport (especially in the case of
dedicated ships) would make the latter operation
extremely difficult. Given that the cargo remains on
the ship, terrorists might attempt to take the ship to
some location (or take the ship over in that location) and
then sink it, or detonate a conventional explosive in it,
or start a fire, or threaten to do any of these things
unless demands are met. Of course, none of these
activities would result in a nuclear explosion but they
might result in the release of nuclear material into the
environment. The final scenario set that is considered is
the possibility of a suicide assault on the nuclear–cargo
carrying ship itself, in the manner of the attack on the
American destroyer, Cole (2000), and the later, similar
attack on a French oil tanker (Limburg), or something
similar, by aerial or subsurface means. Again, the
possible consequences, in terms of the release of nuclear
material, are evaluated. It needs to be noted that insofar
as they concern shipment on dedicated ships, none of the
possibilities outlined in the summaries above has ever
been exemplified in some 50 years experience of nuclear
transport by sea. This tells us something in general
about the level of risk (although it must also be
recognised that the aspirations and capabilities of
terrorist groups do evolve). To go beyond this we need
to look at the main possibilities in a detailed way.
Seizing nuclear cargoes from dedicated
ships (or seizing ships, themselves)
The scenarios that have most exercised the minds of
commentators and protesters are those in which
dedicated nuclear cargo ships are assaulted with a view
to seizing the ship, or its cargo. This came particularly to
the fore, in the case of the late 2004 shipment of
weapons grade plutonium from the US port of
Charleston to the French port of Cherbourg on the
PNTL ships Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal3 (in an
operation called colloquially, ‘Eurofab’). Of this
Greenpeace said, that it was ‘an invitation to cata-
strophe: either a radioactive leak or an attempt by a
terrorist group to seize the shipment and make a nuclear
bomb of its own’. This latter scenario, in which the
envisaged perpetrators board the ship and take control
of it, is the one that we are immediately concerned with
here. The possibility that they might, then, proceed to
make a nuclear weapon, or weapons, (or make any other
use of their position in control of the ship) is considered
later.
The envisaged operation can be broken down into a
series of stages. In the first place, the terrorists would
need to locate and approach the ships. They would then
need to board them and overpower the crew. Therefore,
how easy would this be? To begin with, it needs to be
noted that in the specific case of the September 2004
shipment (Charleston, South Carolina to Cherbourg,
France) there was no stopping at intermediate ports and
no passing through narrow straits, which might have
provided an easier opportunity for interception. This is
also true of MOX shipments from Europe to Japan,
following reprocessing of Japanese spent fuel in Britain
or France. Therefore, in all such cases, the attack must
take place at either end of the voyage (where extra
security is available from shore based or coastal assets,
as it was, for example, when the ships left Charleston),
or in mid ocean. Details of this were provided in a letter
from the US Department of Homeland Security to
Congressman Edward Markey on 8 September 2004.4
The letter refers to Coast Guard cutters, aircraft and
‘other law enforcement and Navy assets’. These security
arrangements, together with those for the overland
shipment of the material in the United States, are
described in a report prepared for Greenpeace
International and accepted as more than the minimum
required by IAEA regulations (and, as such, satisfac-
tory).5 The corresponding arrangements at the French
end were equally stringent, with French special forces on
board the ships from the 20 mile limit and extensive
back-up arrangements for the land component. In a
midocean situation, the logistical burden on the
terrorists is much greater (they need a larger vessel
and, presumably, lighter attack craft, as well) and, of
course, they need to find their quarry. Reports of
attempted interceptions by protest ships of other
shipments on the high seas suggest that this may not
be easy. Of course, as far as is known, there have been
no terrorist attempts to intercept nuclear ships and it is
notable that the two suicide attacks on other ships (the
Cole and the Limburg) took place in harbour or close to
shore. Distance from land (and speed) is ultimately the
best guarantee of security. Would-be attackers need to
be able to place themselves ahead of their quarry, and
they really only get one shot at interception. On the
other hand, their quarry has (in mid ocean) a wide range
of possible tracks and it can be presumed that PNTL
ships would be taking full advantage of that. The time
taken for the outward voyage from Charleston suggests
that the ships did not take the shortest possible route.
Notwithstanding the major difficulty that terrorists
might have in locating their quarry, it will now be
presumed for the sake of argument that the terrorists
have found the ships. They now need to approach
without being detected. This is going to be extremely
difficult. The PNTL ships are equipped with modern
radar systems and night vision capability; in the case of
plutonium cargoes, there are two ships that will be hard
to distinguish at a distance (and only one may have the
cargo). In addition, there are redundant systems on each
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of the ships, just in case of equipment failure. The ships
also carry extra crew over what might be expected in an
ordinary civilian cargo ship and the operators also err
on the side of caution in the matter of personal
qualifications, so that the possibility that a particular
skill is not available (through accident or illness) is
reduced to minimal levels. Thus, the chances that the
would-be attackers could approach undetected are
extremely small. This is important since the PNTL ships
are known to be armed with three 30 mm, rapid fire
naval guns. These would present a considerable problem
to any vessel attempting an unauthorised approach and
this may be thought to be a sufficient deterrent to any
but the most determined and prepared. The terrorists
would need to deploy undetected and in mid ocean,
several armoured and well armed attack vessels with a
substantial force to man them. It also needs to be noted
that the PNTL ships, when carrying plutonium cargoes
(including reactor grade material in the form of MOX),
carry an additional complement of armed police officers
(the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, CNC), who have
access to a variety of weapons, including rifles, shotguns
and handguns, etc., as well as protective equipment such
as body armour and gas masks. They also have available
‘non-lethal response’ methods, which include high pres-
sure water cannon. All this surveillance and defensive
capability is coordinated through a Vessel Alarm Station.
It is from here that operations would be controlled in the
event of a security threat of the kind being envisaged.
This suggests that the terrorist boarding party might
have some difficulty even after it had got to its quarry.
They now need to get aboard a moving vessel, with
nobody likely to be throwing down a ladder. In fact, the
attackers are going to need some sort of extendable pole
ladder at this point. Operating this in the open ocean
while travelling at around 14 knots and with the
possibility of being fired upon from above would seem
to present an insuperable challenge. There would be only
one way around this and that would be to use
helicopters for the assault. These would need to be
large, in order to carry an attacking force of such a size
that it would not be immediately overwhelmed by the
defenders. This, in turn, would require a substantial
platform from which to fly the helicopters and would
raise the level of sophistication required for the
operation yet another notch (although the possibility
of deploying helicopters would vastly improve the search
capability of the assault force). There is also the
difficulty that the PNTL ships have defensive systems
that would constitute a substantial deterrent to a
helicopter landing, which means that an airborne assault
force would need to rappel down to reach the ships. Of
course, the operations envisaged here are within the
capability of the Special Forces of major states and thus
may be said to be theoretically possible for other parties.
On the other hand, there are no precedents for this kind
of operation by non-state parties and it is scarcely
credible that a terrorist organisation (however, well
funded) could mount such an extensive and technically
sophisticated operation far from shore and without
being detected by the relevant security services.
Threat assessments
Much of the above account of the protective measures
available in the sort of case under review is taken
entirely from open sources. From briefings given to this
author by persons in, or close to, the security agencies in
the various countries concerned, it is clear that there are
many other security provisions that are not in the public
domain, and the total effect of these is to add greatly to
the difficulties enumerated above, especially in the most
sensitive cases. Collectively, these would seem to present
such a challenge to would-be attackers as to make an
attack of the kind envisaged extremely unlikely to
succeed (or even to be attempted). It also seems clear
that the assault ship(s) in this sort of case would be very
vulnerable to detection by satellite surveillance systems,
or by ships or aeroplanes, depending on circumstances.
In the special case of the weapons grade plutonium
shipment (‘Eurofab’), it seems clear that the track of the
PNTL ships was followed very closely so as to monitor
the possibility that other unidentified ships were
approaching. It is also clear that in this case the PNTL
ships were watched over in other ways. Consultations
with officials in Washington seemed to confirm that
some kind of continuous monitoring of the ships was in
place. At one point the somewhat enigmatic observation
was made that ‘they (the ships) were never alone’. This is
the sort of matter that would be included in the official
threat assessments that are required for shipments of
this kind. These are routinely made by persons in a
variety of agencies in the countries, including depart-
ments of transport, energy and foreign affairs, as well as
the various national intelligence and security bureaux,
and, of course, persons from the companies concerned.
These consultations and deliberations give rise to
comprehensive evaluations of potential threats to the
ships or the cargoes, which are called design basis threat
assessments (DBTs). These are not public documents,
and, in the nature of things, they could not be so. To
publish what had been anticipated (and prepared for)
would merely be an invitation to potential malefactors
to devise something that had not. On the other hand, not
publishing DBTs means that the concerned citizen
cannot assure himself that every possibility has been
thought of. In the opinion of the author, the first
principle is the most important among the two. This is
particularly so since the second requirement (that
everything has been thought of) may be logically
impossible to show. How could you know that there
was still not something you had not thought about?
However, one might be satisfied that the amount of
work that had been conducted was such as to reduce the
chance of successful terrorist assault to negligible levels.
In the case of less security sensitive cargoes (spent
fuel, or separated fission products), there will generally
be only one ship (i.e. no escort) and less need for
dedicated security personnel to be carried, unless there
are intelligence indications to the contrary. In the case of
the separated fission products (usually transported in the
form of a solid ceramic material in a steel vessel, which is
itself contained within a very substantial transport
flask), the lower security assessment is based on the fact
that the most that this material could be used for is for
some sort of radiation dispersal operation, and even
then it is in a most unpromising form (from the
terrorists’ point of view). It could not be the basis of
even the most rudimentary nuclear explosive device.
Spent fuel certainly contains small amounts of pluto-
nium (in a mixture of isotopes) and even smaller
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amounts of unused uranium 235, from which (in
principle) a nuclear explosive could be fabricated, but
these are, equally, in a most unpromising form. Not only
are they mixed with the extremely radioactive products
of fission and a large amount of uranium 238 (from
which they would need to be separated), they are also
contained within fuel rods from which they are not easy
to extract. Apart from the radiation danger, there are
also physical factors here. Some spent fuel rods may
have been deformed by long exposure to high tempera-
tures in the reactor core. Insofar as this is the case, their
contents are not accessible in the way that the fuel pellets
in fresh fuel rods would be. In practical terms, the most
spent fuel could be used for would be radiological
contamination. Whatever else may be said, this is a
significantly lesser danger, and thus, it is appropriate to
treat such cargoes as less security sensitive.
Greenpeace responses
It is noteworthy that these security provisions (including
the most stringent, as in the weapons grade plutonium
case) inevitably fail to satisfy greenpeace and other
opponents of the trade. The grounds of this dissatisfac-
tion are made clear in a report commissioned by
Greenpeace International and conducted by their
French and British consultants (WISE–Paris and
Large and Associates). In the view of these consultants,
the security arrangements did not go far enough, given
the heightened risk of terrorism since September 2001. It
was said that the United Kingdom authorities, who were
responsible for the maritime component of the 2004/
2005 plutonium transfer, did not have a ‘definitive list of
DBTs’ (although how they might have known this is not
at all clear) and appeared to be resistant to planning for
possible terrorist actions’. Specifically, they noted that
the regulatory requirements for this kind of shipment6
specify that ‘one or more escorts’ must be provided and
that, even in this most sensitive case, that was all that
was provided. In the view of the author, the latter
criticism was very wide of the mark. It was simply that
the full security plan was not (for obvious reasons) made
public. The ‘Eurofab’ shipment was a special case and
there were significant additional security provisions in
place. Apart from anything else, it would have been
undesirable to publicly establish new norms which might
then be expected in the case of less sensitive shipments,
such as those containing commercial plutonium or
MOX fuel.
In the general case, and from a strictly logical point of
view, it is undeniable that there would be more security
if there was additional security support but, equally, it
may be doubted whether the expense of such additional
steps would be justified by the quotient of additional
security that they would buy. Particularly, this would
seem to be the situation, having regard to the challenges
that already confront the would-be terrorist, on the basis
of the known security arrangements, and in the absence
of specific evidence of the possession by terrorist groups
of the sort of capability that could overcome them. Also,
it may be doubted whether Greenpeace criticisms of
the specifics of the security arrangements are entirely
sincere. They want to prevent the activity (shipments of
nuclear material, and, more generally, nuclear opera-
tions of all kinds) and one may conclude that no amount
of additional provisions would really satisfy them.
Using cargo
Notwithstanding the above arguments, which tend to
suggest that seizure of a dedicated ship with its nuclear
cargo is very unlikely to succeed, the discussion will now
continue on the basis of exactly that assumption, i.e.
that the transport vessel has been seized. At this point
the scenarios diverge into those that entail separation of
the cargo from the ship and those that do not. As far as
the former is concerned, it should be noted that
commercial cargoes of spent fuel, MOX, or high level
waste (HLW), on the Japanese run, are generally
contained within very substantial transport flasks, which
weigh over 100 tons. The immediate issue is whether the
contents can be removed without moving the transport
flask. If they cannot, then the flask itself must be taken.
As far as the opening flasks is concerned, there are two
problems. The first is that there is generally insufficient
space in the hold of the ship to remove the very
substantial safety protection on either end of the cask
and that specialist equipment is necessary to remove
flask lids. The thick walls of the flask would also make
cutting into it an extremely protracted exercise and, even
then, the size of the internal packaging is going to make
removal of the contents very difficult. This is very
significant, since ‘delay’ is a central element in the
overall security strategy. That the ship has been taken
will be known from a very early stage and there are
arrangements in place to alert operators to any false
messages of reassurance. From the point when the first
alarm report is received (or if the communications
systems fail to operate as intended), serious forces are
likely to be converging on the scene (depending on the
circumstances and the location).
There is another factor here. If the cargo is spent fuel
or separated fission products (high level waste), opening
the package is likely to expose the attackers to huge
doses of gamma radiation and the possibility of instant
death for those involved. These sorts of materials can
only be dealt with in remote handling facilities.
As far as removing the unopened flasks is concerned,
it should be noted that, although the ships are fitted with
a substantial hoist system that is capable of lifting the
hold covers, it is not capable of lifting the flasks
themselves. In the case of plutonium or MOX ship-
ments, even these hoists are removed, so that opening
the hatches in mid ocean would require the attackers to
have brought their own heavy lifting equipment and this
would be very substantial if it were to be also capable of
swinging a 100 ton flask out over the side. This adds
another monumental logistical problem if the cargo is to
be removed in mid ocean. The crane is going to be a
large and towering object, difficult to get hold of and
difficult to move without being noticed. Even so, it
would be a fraught operation, assuming that it is being
conducted in mid ocean (the author has some long past
but still vivid experience of unloading equipment of this
sort of weight over the side of a tank landing ship and
into smaller landing craft). Of course, the alternative is
to take the ship and its cargo to a suitable port with
appropriate lifting equipment. This course of action has
its own obvious problems. It would clearly take a
number of days to get to such a suitable port (still
presuming that the interception has taken place on the
high seas) and, all the while, the location of the ship
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would be hard to conceal. As noted above, PNTL
vessels have a strict reporting system when engaged in
these kinds of voyage, so that the fact that there was a
serious problem would be known to the 24hr
Communications Centre almost immediately. The risk
of interception, before any unloading could take place,
would thus be very great.
Terrorist use of ship and cargo
The starting assumption here is that terrorists have
taken control of the ship and its cargo and that, even if
the position of the ship continues to be known, counter
action is inhibited by a threat, from the terrorists, to
take further action against it. The possibilities here are
that the ship is scuttled, or set on fire, or that a large
explosion is set off on the ship (which may also result in
either or both of the former possibilities).
Some scenarios that involve the ship and its cargo at
the bottom of the ocean have already been extensively
studied in the context of accidental events, such as severe
collision or grounding. In the specific case of fresh MOX
fuel, the results of a series of technical studies by the
Central Research Institute of the Electric Power
Industry of Japan (CRIEPI) were reported in 1998.7
The studies covered: the performance of the transport
cask; the performance of the cladding around the MOX
pellets; and, assuming both of these to have failed, on
the rate at which nuclides in the package would leach
into the surrounding water. The conclusions were
unequivocal. The intact transport casks were resistant
to water pressure down to 7000 m and thus the casks
were not expected to rupture and expose their contents.
Tests on the MOX fuel rods revealed a similar resistance
to breach down to the same depth. In the extremely
unlikely event that both of these barriers failed, it would
be expected that radioactive material would begin to
slowly leach into the immediate environment but at a
rate that would add only negligibly to the ambient
radioactivity. In terms of potential radiation exposure,
doses to be expected were fewer than one-millionth of
the relevant ICRP dose equivalent limit. Similar studies
have been undertaken of the parallel risks from casks
containing vitrified fission products (high level waste).8
Here again, the robust nature of the transport packaging
and the low leach rate from the vitrified material
suggested negligible risk. In fact the probability that
exposed individuals would receive doses that exceeded
recommended limits for members of the public, as a
result of collision or accident, was put at 2610218. The
authors of the study also noted that salvage possibilities
also made it extremely unlikely that there would be any
significant public exposure in any event.
The shipment casks used in the case of the US
plutonium sent to France in October 2004 and in the
returning MOX fuel assemblies in 2005 were signifi-
cantly less massive than the casks used in other cases
(1K and 4 tons respectively), so that, all else being
equal, they would present less of a problem to move.
The casks were nonetheless of very substantial construc-
tion, consisting, in the case of the plutonium oxide
powder, of a concentric arrangement of ‘cans’, with a
carbon steel outer layer.9 They were also in a substantial
outer container (like an armoured shipping container)
from which they would have had to be removed.
Together, these cladding materials and the surrounding
packaging would provide a substantial barrier to
terrorists’ access to the active material, notwithstanding
that they are significantly less massive than the casks
used on the longer voyages to Japan.
In the case of sabotage (as opposed to accident, and
thinking now of the more general case, where the
nuclear material is not seen as potentially nuclear
weapon material) it can be supposed that the terrorists
would wish to affect the sinking in coastal or inland
waters but it seems evident from the above data that this
would scarcely be worth the effort in terms of its
environmental impact. Merely submerging the casks
would produce no nuclear contamination and, even a
systematic effort to breach the transport containers and
expose the contents (itself a formidable undertaking in
the confines of the ship), would produce low levels of
contamination. Sinking in deep waters would have an
even smaller environmental impact, although salvage
would be more difficult.
After all, what we are left with is fire and explosion.
Assuming the ship to have been taken over, fires could
be started in various places, with the normal fire fighting
mechanisms disabled. Like the immersion contingencies,
this contingency has also been studied in the context of
accidental fire10 and the results of this study may be
applied to the supposed terrorist sabotage case. In
general, the sort of package used for the transport of
nuclear materials is resistant to all but the hottest and
most persistent of fires (which are unlikely to occur
accidentally in the hold of the ship).11 To achieve any
breach of the package seals would require the con-
trivance of high temperatures for a prolonged period.
This, in turn, suggests that there would be a need for
additional combustible material, which would have to be
procured from somewhere and loaded on to the target
ship. This would, in turn, suggest further substantial
logistical problems. Even at the end of this effort, the
amount of radioactive material released to the environ-
ment might be trivially small. Taking control of an oil
tanker (or, better still from the terrorist’s point of view,
an LNG tanker) and setting it on fire would seem to be a
far better bet, in terms of public spectacle. This point
was dramatically underlined by a speaker in a June 2006
energy conference in Darwin, Australia. Professor Yea
Byeon-Deok was quoted as saying that a 100 000 ton
LNG tanker ‘has four times the energy potential of the
atomic bomb used to hit Hiroshima’.12
There is a final possibility to be considered, and that is
that terrorists who have taken over the ship use
explosive (and, especially, ‘shaped’) charges to breach
the shipping casks and release some quantity of the
nuclear material within. The Greenpeace International
consultants discussed this possibility at some length in
the context of the French overland component of US
plutonium shipments to France. In the course of this
discussion, they claimed that tests performed by the
French nuclear protection institute (IRSN) show that
the FS47 cask (as used in the Eurofab case) is vulnerable
to breach by advanced modern shaped charge muni-
tions, and that this could result in the ejection of a
significant quantity of the plutonium oxide powder
(although IRSN deny this). Given the consultants’
further claim that such an outcome could be achieved
through the deployment of a rocket propelled grenade, it
may be that there is some need for further scientific
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testing. More generally, the experts at IRSN are
currently engaged in evaluating a whole range of
scenarios involving different shipping containers and
differing contents against possible modes of assault. Of
course, it would not be in the interests of security to
make the results of these tests public and, in any case,
this can never be a static situation. As in other contexts,
the security authorities need to continue to respond to
innovation on the part of potential threat groups. On the
other hand, there is no need for them to assist the latter
by telling them of the progress they have made.
The applicability of this to the maritime context is
limited. Breach of the shipping flask from outside the
ship would be impossible (the missile would lose much
of its momentum and all of its accuracy passing through
the double hull of the ship, even if the terrorists knew
precisely where to aim). A missile or shaped charge
inside the hold might (if the Greenpeace consultants are
right) displace some plutonium powder but the ejecta
would be held within the hold itself. The scenario in
which activities of this kind (in respect of all or most of
the packages) are then followed, in a subsequent stage,
by further explosions or fire intended to breach the
holds, raises the whole operation to a new level of
complexity and uncertainty, especially when taken with
the difficulties of taking the ship in the first place. It
might also add very greatly to the time that would be
required to make these various preparations. It also
needs to be noticed that the claimed vulnerability of the
‘Eurofab’ packages would not apply to the much more
massive casks used on the Japan/Europe run.
Terrorist attacks on nuclear cargo ships
There remains the possibility that a ship carrying a
nuclear cargo is attacked by ramming it with a small,
fast vessel carrying a substantial explosive charge: a
maritime suicide attack. This sort of attack has been
exemplified in the case of the assault on the USS Cole in
Aden in 2000 (12 October) and in the subsequent attack
(in October 2002, off Yemen) on the French oil tanker,
MV Limburg. There was also a failed attack of this kind
on the USS The Sullivans, off Yemen in January 2000.
In this case, a boat full of explosives sank before it could
reach the ship. Some commentators predict that this is a
mode of attack that will become common in the years
ahead, on the grounds that maritime transport is
presently more vulnerable than air transport. Indeed, it
is claimed that ‘al-Qaeda may have developed a terrorist
naval force of 15220 vessels’ for just this sort of
purpose. Other reports, citing ‘US intelligence officials’,
talk of ‘between 12 and 300 ships’ having been
identified.13 Other experts, again, are somewhat cynical
about these claims.
The question for this study is what might be the
dangers to ships carrying nuclear cargoes from an attack
of this kind? As far as shipments on dedicated ships are
concerned, the first need is to assess their vulnerability to
the sort of attack experienced by the Cole and the
Limburg. In both cases, media reports suggest that some
400 to 500 lbs of TNT equivalent explosive, packed in a
small fibre glass or inflatable craft, was used to tear a
hole, several metres across, in the hull of each ship. The
impact of the attack in each case suggests that the
explosive might have been in the form of a shaped
charge. A contemporary report in the London Times
(reporter Ian Brodie) hints that the technical sophistica-
tion of the attack suggests professional or ‘government’
involvement. The Limburg was of a modern, double hull
construction, with 20 mm thick side plate. Despite this,
inner compartments were breached and there was a
severe fire from leaking oil. By contrast, the hull plate on
the Cole was only half the thickness, at 10 mm, and in
this case there was limited fire. On the other hand,
damage to the Cole may have been more structurally
severe. Neither ship sank.
It is reasonable to suppose that a similar attack on a
PNTL ship would cause similar damage, although the
system of 20 mm steel horizontal collision reinforcement
plates between the inner and outer hulls might be
expected to dissipate very considerably the blast effect.
With no inflammable cargo, significant fire is unlikely
and the double hull construction of PNTL ships suggests
that there would be a very low risk of sinking. As noted
earlier, the extremely robust construction of the trans-
port casks (forged steel up to 250 mm thick, in the case
of cargoes to and from Japan) suggests that it is
extremely unlikely that these would be breached. It is
even more unlikely that a large hole and a substantial list
might permit a container that had somehow become
detached to slip out into the sea; and it is also highly
unlikely that a container could become detached, since
the containers in these ships are tied to the floor of the
hold with large bolts. It also needs to be noted that both
the Cole and the Limburg were stationary at the time
they were attacked (they were alongside, or moored at a
buoy) and that PNTL ships in French harbours are
protected by a floating barrier, which is intended to
prevent just such an assault. In other cases the mooring
is completely enclosed.
There is also the possibility of assault by air, as by a
small plane packed with explosives (i.e. an aerial suicide
attack). Such a plane would be vulnerable to the naval
cannon and small arms carried in the case of sensitive
cargoes but these could not guarantee that such an
attack would fail. In this case, there could be a
significant damage to the ship, although it is very
unlikely to cause much (if any) release of radioactive
material. Again, the extremely robust character of the
transport casks would prevent this. Probably the ship
would not sink as a result of such an attack, having
regard to its special buoyancy features, but even if this
happened, the consequence would merely be that the
cargo (still in its flasks) would be on the bottom of the
sea. If we are presuming attack by a small plane, we
must also presume that the attack has taken place not
far from land (bearing in mind the likely range of a small
plane with a heavy load of explosives). As noted earlier,
this would mean that salvage would be relatively straight
forward. We might also note that the further the ship
was from land, the greater would be the difficulty (for
the attacker) in finding it in the first place. There is also
the question of where (in relation to the likely track of
the ship) the attack aeroplane is actually flying from.
Given that we are talking of a light aircraft, this may
need to be nothing more than a grass strip. On the other
hand, this would significantly restrict the payload and
range. If it were assumed that the attack plane was a
large commercial aeroplane, specially hijacked for the
purpose (i.e. the 9/11 scenario), the consequences of the
impact would be greater, though it would still not
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breach the transport flasks. There would also be greater
difficulty in coordinating the attack and finding and
hitting the target.
At the other end of the scale, there has been
speculation about the possibilities for terrorist attacks
using scuba divers. Whatever effect they might have in
other circumstances, it seems clear from the considera-
tions brought forward in the above discussion that an
attack even by several suicide divers, operating together,
could hardly deploy sufficient explosive to significantly
damage a PNTL ship. In port, the security authorities
are also likely to deploy some kind of underwater
deterrent capability, which would make an attack of this
kind very difficult if not impossible. Of course, it is
accepted that whatever turned out to be the reality in a
particular case, any attack on a nuclear cargo vessel
would be productive of a great deal of comment and
potential public alarm (especially if it occurred close to
land).
The case of a maritime terrorist attack on a container
ship that has some containing radioactive substances
among its containers is different again. If such a ship
were set on fire there is clearly a possibility that nuclear
matter would find its way into the environment. How
big this possibility is, and what the danger would be,
would depend on the nature of the cargo and the
number of containers that actually contained nuclear
material. It also needs to be noted that container ships
frequently carry significant quantities of hazardous
material that is non-nuclear and that the effect of a
terrorist assault of the kind envisaged may be more
significant for the chemical toxicity of what is released
than it is for any radioactive component. The possibi-
lities for this sort of attack are thoroughly explored in an
article by Richardson.14 Richardson does not discuss the
possibility that the nuclear material comes from cargoes
on dedicated ships, or that such a ship is ‘comman-
deered’ to be used as a radiological ‘weapon’.
Conclusion
The substantive discussions above have encompassed
broadly three possibilities for terrorist action against
these ships and their cargoes: terrorists might aim to
take the ship and separate its cargo; they might take the
ship and create some incident involving the ship and
cargo together; or, they might aim to assault the ship
from outside by explosive or missile (including a suicide
aeroplane attack). In the first case, the terrorists need to
find the ship, approach it, and successfully board it and
subdue the defenders. After this they need to unload the
cargo, either in mid ocean, or by taking the ship to a
suitable port without being intercepted. The very
formidable problems entailed in each of these stages
have been elaborated in some detail. It is hard to resist
the conclusion that, taken together, they add up to an
operation that has an extremely low probability of
success, having regard to the known defensive capabil-
ities of the ships concerned and the capabilities that
would be required to overcome them. There are also
significant problems in turning the material thus secured
into a usable device and, if the device is a radiological
one, doubts about whether the actual consequences of
its use would be worth all the efforts. Even if the cargo
that has been seized is plutonium in the form of MOX
fuel, there would be a great deal of technically
sophisticated processing required to turn that into bomb
material, and further difficulties in assembling and
delivering the weapon.
Many of the same considerations apply to the second
envisaged scenario. Again, the ship needs to be taken
and the defenders subdued but in this case there are
crucial difficulties in turning ship and cargo together
into a plausible threat. In great part, these concern the
nature of the cargo itself and the way it is held. The most
likely cargo to which this scenario is applicable is
vitrified high level waste. This is very radioactive
material but there is considerable doubt that it can be
turned easily (or at all) into a form that might constitute
an environmental threat in the event that it was
somehow dispersed. There would be broadly the same
problems in separating MOX fuel from its container and
cladding, with the added drawback that it is only feebly
radioactive. Spent fuel, on the other hand, is certainly
highly radioactive (through the presence of the fission
products) but it, too, would be difficult to get at and, like
the high level waste, very dangerous in the attempt.
Without getting any of these materials out of their
containment, it is not at all evident that a terrorist event
involving significant contamination of the environment
could be contrived.
Scenarios in the third category do not require that the
ship (or ships) be taken. In this case, there is merely an
assault from the ‘outside’ by missile, fast attack vessel,
aeroplane, or frogman. Considerations of what could
actually be achieved by such an operation suggest that
the effect of the attack is unlikely to be anything more
than superficial damage to the ship (although such an
assault could have an impact on the operation of the
ship by damaging equipment and/or killing crew). On
the other hand, the possibility that a dedicated nuclear
cargo vessel could be struck by (say) a missile, cannot be
excluded. This would be most likely when the ship was
close to shore and, perhaps, when ‘protest’ activity
provided the cover for a firing position. More generally,
it is also possible that considerations of restraint and
proportion on the part of security personnel could
inhibit or condition the response to an apparent assault
which threatened only minimal damage. However, it
does need to be noted here, how far this hypothetical
outcome is from the scare scenarios with which we
began.
There is a renewed interest in civilian nuclear power.
In the context of a growing anxiety about climate change
and increasing uncertainty about oil and gas resources,
more countries are acquiring (or intending to acquire)
nuclear capacity and countries that have it are planning
further developments. These factors, together with a
desire to internationalise the more sensitive nuclear
technologies, seem likely to bring on more shipments of
nuclear material to more destinations. It will be
important to make sure that this is performed as safely
as it can be, both as regards accidents, and as regards the
terrorist threat. Present regulatory standards and
practices, especially in regard to dedicated ships, such
as those operated by PNTL and the Japanese and
Swedish utilities, provide very considerable assurance
that this is so. There is very little prospect of an attack of
the kind envisaged in the above scenarios having any
serious consequences beyond the inevitable media frenzy
it would undoubtedly provoke.
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